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Introduction
What struck the young student of mathematics at the college of La F leche
was the absolute certainty of their demonstrations. More speciﬁcally, he was
impressed by the contrast between these proofs and the literary tradition, for
“/ had compared the moral writings of the ancients pagans to the most proud
and magniﬁcent palaces built on nothing but sand and mud”. Still, while
he grants the are unquestionable, Descartes discovered both in geometry
and arithmetic, an essential useleness and futility, an appreciation he will
maintain all throughout his life.
These ﬁrst impressions might account for two emotions “joy and unease”2
frequently to be found at once in Descartes’ mathematical works. In his work
we ﬁnd a combination of joy of discovery3, clear ideas and of mastership over
methods, and uneasiness caused by the puerile, futile character of the very
mathematical object itself. This ambivalence is present clearly and explicitly
throughout Geometry.
For Descartes to achieve peace of mind he will have to “discover their true
use”and recognise that “the certainty and evidence of their arguments”which
he enjoys so much, does not give assistance“the mechanical arts only”. He
therefore had to build something “more essential on such ﬁrm and substantial
foundations”4.
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1. The Truth of The Traditional Corpus
We shall have to re-examine the Cartesian critique of contemporary mathe-
matics, but ﬁrst of all there is an important point to be made: even in their
present disorganised condition, mathematics do produce -generally speaking-
true results. The Euclidian corpus, is accepted wholesale- so are the works
of Apollinius and Archimedes. In Descartes’ work we do not ﬁnd any dis-
cussions of the truth of the ﬁrst principles of geometry. Deﬁnitions, axioms
and postulates of elementary geometry are accepted with all the guarantees
of the ’natural light of understanding’. As we are told in Meditations, apart
from the ego, the thinking subject, and God, mathematical truths are the
last truths I can doubt, and are also the ﬁrst truths to escape from hyperbolic
doubt.
2. The Possible Errors of Judgment
If elementary geometry and its classical results are not open to doubt, this
was far from the case for contemporary mathematics (for instance Cavalieri’s
mathematics and some of Fermat’s methods). Generally for one and the same
reason: mathematical demonstrations implying inﬁnitesimal methods slip out
of the grip of certain knowledge.
Thus we see Descartes triumphing over Debeaune’s diﬃcult problem invol-
ving an inﬁnite regression, but refusing to validate his own solution: one
cannot conceive the limit the relevant series tend to, thus the human mind
cannot understand the result6.
Some of the methods of the Ancients were shown to involve the same fault.
The one the most often referred to by Descartes himself was Hyppias’ quadra-
tric.
But there is more to this, since a correct result or construction can never-
theless include an error. This is a very characteristic insight of the Cartesian
critique. A logically conclusive demonstrative process can still be questio-
nable in geometrical terms, or to put it more precisely, wrong in terms of
method. An additional criteria, conforming to the precepts of the method,
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must be respected: that is the principle of simplicity. In the beginning of the
third book of Geometry Descartes states this explicitly, giving an example.
If a construction (in this case we are dealing with a construction of mean
proportions) can be produced using diﬀerent curves, it is¡imperative to use
only the simplest one. To have recourse to a more complex curve, however
impeccable the demonstration may be, is a mistake. It might be that the use
of a more composite curve oﬀers an easier construction; whatever the case, it
must be rejected in favour of a less composite curve, even if the construction
is thereby rendered more diﬃcult. This approach conformed neither to the
classical tradition, nor to modem mathematical procedures which put a pre-
mium on demonstrative elegance and deductive exactness. But the principle
is entirely in keeping with the Cartesian method according to which it is
necessary to respect this principle in order to maintain a proper procedure
in science, unfolding it step by step without omitting a single stage, avoiding
any jumps which would break the links of the chain of reasoning.
As we have seen, Descartes was looking for the true use of mathematics, and
he does ﬁnd it. It lies at the very heart of the method, and this is granted
from the very birth of it. The Regulae and Discours de la Me´thode bring new
evidences of the same point. Intuition, the rule evidence, the decomposition
of complex questions into absolute elements, the formation of more complex
questions according to a speciﬁc order, the simultaneous consideration of all
data, in a word, the precepts of the method are more obviously employed in
geometry and algebra than in any other ﬁeld of knowledge.
The privileged role of mathematics is stressed right from the start of Regulae
since, as Descartes tells us, geometry and arithmetic are entirely adequate for
the certain touch of divinity which is, in the human mind, the place where
the ﬁrst seeds of useful thought already lie.
Thus we are convinced that in these scienceswe will ﬁnd the sparks of certain
truths. The proof is that, even without a good method, the fruits of geometry
are already spontaneously remarkable.
While distinctions are made in the ﬁelds of knowledge and there are many
diﬀerent sciences, there is but a single and unique way for progressing from
true intuitions to secure deductions and from the most simple statements
to the most complex theorems. Now, this approach is best conceived and
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understood in matters which are particularly simple and easy, such as geo-
metry, arithmetic and algebra. The Discours de la Me´thode is based on this
argument.
No other science can oﬀer so obvious and certain examples. But this should
not be misinterpreted; if facility, adequation and exemplarity save mathema-
tics as a discipline, it remains nevertheless no more than a triﬂe, concerned
with useless problems which arithmeticians and geometers play to while away
their leisure time.
Descartes’ claim is not therefore to have provided mathematics with a larger
body of fragmentary knowledge, it is of producing a uniﬁed picture. This
project, announced in the Discours de la Me´thode, consists speciﬁcally in
replacing the diﬀerent ﬁelds of mathematics by a uniﬁed theory.
Ease and certainty, the two characteristics of ordinary mathematics, are a
sign of something more fundamental: a ﬁeld open to human reason, but
being so poorly developed and still producing such impressive fruits, is nec-
essarily exceptionally fertile. What more could be expected by organising it
and developing it according to the method! A mass of new results, original
theorems, and above all the recognition of the power of the acting method,
and thus, a new, reorganised, uniﬁed and well-structured mathematics. Na-
turally this second, dual result is far more important than an accumulation
of new propositions, even if they are true.
On the other hand, the tools of the method were in any case going to be forged
and sharpened in that very process of the reorganisation of mathematical
knowledge. According to Descartes, it was through a consideration of the
faults and advantages of the various ﬁelds of mathematics that he “came to
think some other method had to be looked for”9. The most relevant examples
relating to intuition were taken from that science (especially from geometry)
and the process and validity of deductive chains were apparent in it.
“These long chains of reasonings, all of them simple and easy to understand,
which geometers are accustomed to using to build up their most diﬃcult
demonstrations, had given me cause to imagine that everything which can
be accessible to the human understanding may be logically ordered in the
same way. . . ”10. This conﬁrms what the Regulae had already taught us,
occasionally in greater detail.
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A counterpoint lowering the elevated object is however ever-present, “con-
sidering that, among all those people that looked for true knowledge in the
sciences, only the mathematicians were able to ﬁnd out demonstrations, that
is to say, certain and evident reasons, l had no doubt that it was by the same
things which they had examined that l should begin, although l did not ex-
pect any other usefulness from this but to accustom my mind to feed on
truths and not to be content with false reasons”.
Such statements should be kept in mind to explain why mathematics does not
appear in the tree of philosophical knowledge represented in the Introduction
of the Rincipes de la Philosophie..
And so mathematics was to remain modestly as a separate science, despite its
grandiose role in the overall System. In its reorganised and properly elaborat-
ed form, the role of mathematics was to help form the real tools for attaining
certain knowledge. This is Professor F.Alquie’s view when he writes“we un-
derstand clearly the meaning of the last four precepts. They are drawn from
his reﬂection of mathematical method, and Descartes hoped to extend the
mathematical method to all the sciences”.
3. Criticisms of The Traditional Fields Of Ma-
thematics
The Discours de la Me´thode presents an inventory in which the three arts or
sciences involved in mathematics, namely formal logic, geometrical analysis
and modem algebra, are all found to be faulty and insuﬃcient.
“This was why l thought l must look for some other method which would
cumulate the advantages of these three branches and be free from their
mistakes”∧3.
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3.1. A Critique of Formal Logic
Logic claims to be an autonomous, distinct subject, a foundation beyond all
knowledge. However, it has two particularly serious faults. Firstly, it replaces
living thought with automatic thinking, and in that sense “Syllogistical ﬁgu-
res are of no help to discover truth”
This is to say that this single, autonomous science is hollow, that it is dan-
gerous since it has no object. A relatively simple solution is proposed: to
dedicate the conﬁdent methods of the syllogism to living intellectual activi-
ty, one which produces knowledge.
The rules of syllogism can never surpass or obscure intuition and deduction,
the only two true means to knowledge. Now, intuition can never be separated
from its object in any way, and deduction can never be purely formal. The
stages of reasoning which are so clearly identiﬁed in mathematics invalidate
formal logic as a separate science. The logic of syllogism must be replaced by
a living logic, an analysis which “shows the real path by which something is
invented methodically, and reveals how eﬀects depend on causes; such that,
if the reader wishes to follow it, carefully examining everything it contains,
he will no less conceive the conclusion thus demonstrated or make it his own
than if he himself had discovered it”
3.2. A Critique of Classical Geometry
The geometry of the Ancients, the science of ﬁgures and construction of
lines, oﬀers both the best attributes and some of the worst faults to impede
knowledge.
Geometry’s strength is that it is related to extension, which is essential to
all material bodies. Its object is produced by an examination of dimensions
and continuous quantity, and it is therefore a privileged path to true mathe-
matics. In that way, Cartesian mathematics are above all geometry. I will
return to this issue, but let us observe now that according to Descartes other
mathematical ﬁelds were not to separate themselves from lines, nor from
the continuous magnitudes of geometry which alone provide the content for
symbolic processes.
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Still, the geometry of the Ancients appeared to be doubly in fault. Firstly,
because it was fragmentary. As M. Marie reminds us “There was no link
between the curves studied by the Ancients, nor was there any means of es-
tablishing one, so that the study of one was of no beneﬁt to any of the others;
ﬁnally, their very identity was not even established, for one and the same
curve of some complexity endowed with an inﬁnite number of diﬀerent prop-
erties, will therefore have an inﬁnite number of deﬁnitions which were often
very diﬃcult to bring into concordant relationships”.
Secondly, traditional geometry was too restricted to the consideration of ﬁ-
gures and depended too heavily on a strictly reproductive imagination which
considered only such images resembling the objects causing them. The ﬁgu-
res of the Ancient’s geometry were accepted because of the spatial reality
they reﬂected, which was in fact a source of obscurity rather than clarity;
consequently Descartes proposed to abandon this spatial realism14. The re-
form was intended to keep geometry in the ﬁeld of continuous magnitudes or
extension, while involving its lines in a general, orderly algorithm.
3.3. A Critique of the Algebra of the Modems
The algebra Descartes criticised is then that science which works on letters
those operations which are supposed to be valid for numbers. The advan-
tages Descartes recognised in the algebra of the Modems are well-known.
This “sort of arithmetic relieves the imagination”and helps to make clear
diﬃculties hidden by the confusion of numbers. However he also had consid-
erable reproaches to make on this new ﬁeld.
1. The notation was still confusing and heavy-handed; Descartes proposed
a thorough going reform of it.
2. Many results concerning the solution of equations were still missing.
The theory of equations and polynomial roots were developed arbitrar-
ily and in a disorderly manner.
3. Above all, ordinary algebra was based on a particularly poor understan-
ding of dimension. This restrictive notion was why algebraists could on-
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ly deal with roots, squares and cubes by associating them with length,
surface and volume, treated as three categories of magnitude.
The representation of all dimensions and powers by lines unquestionably
outgrows the algebra of the Moderns. This form of representation was possible
because dimension is nothing other than the mode in which a subject can be
measured and thus all quantities can be reduced to length according to the
method demonstrated in the ﬁrst pages of Geometry.
It was necessary to envisage and bring about this rapprochement of geometry
and algebra in order to reveal the real potential of mathematics.
The goal of the essential method presented at the beginning of Geometry,
book one, should allow to reduce the study of ﬁgures to that of lines, indeed
as straight lines, in order, at a later stage, to deﬁne those ﬁgures through the
inter connexions of those lines. This method reduces disorder, the major fault
of the geometry of the Ancients. The examination and classiﬁcation of ratios
between lines provides a criteria for the ordering and unity of geometry: from
the most simple to the most complex ratios, this method covered the entire
area of geometry.
It was only after this that the contribution of the Ancients could be incor-
porated, when needed. Their discoveries were worthy of consideration and
were true. Descartes needed to give form to a geometry in which Euclidean
propositions, Apollonius’ theories of the properties of conicals and the theory
of proportions, would all be demonstrated again. They would ﬁt into position
like puzzle pieces which have already been pieced together and which ﬁnally
ﬁt into the ﬁnished picture. J.L Marion writes “In this sense the Method
undertakes a recuperation of arbitrary inventions in terms of certainty”.
The idea of relating mathematical objects to lines naturally requires an exa-
mination of the rules for using these lines.
As a set of a general arithmetic, algebra could not be of any use in this
project. It was therefore necessary to separate this algorithm and its connec-
ted symbols from the concept of number. The letters to be used in calculations
and transformations would no longer represent numbers nor measurements,
instead they were to indicate the length of lines.∗∗∗
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Although the ordinary objects of algebra were replaced, the rules of calcula-
tions were retained intact. The certainty of algebraic procedures, as received
from arithmetic, had to remain unharmed and unaltered even as the nature
of the objects designated by the letters of the algebraic script were altered.
The procedures themselves were not at all in doubt and as Descartes empha-
sised from the time of the writing of Regulae, algebraic procedures respected
methodical requirements: “And by this means we not only save the space of
many words, but what is more important, we shall make the elements of the
diﬃculty so clear and simple, that, even while nothing useful is omitted, still
nothing superﬂuous will ever be found in it which could encumber the mind
when it is necessary to consider several things at once”
Having posited that in geometry ﬁgures should be reduced to lines, Descartes
named them with letters. The letters of algebraic geometry are not num-
bers, they are magnitudes. The property of these magnitudes is that they
can be constructed and are therefore under the jurisdiction of the geometry
of curves and ﬁgures and may be manipulated according to the rules of a
specious algebra. This is why algebra, in Descartes’ System, does not aim at
an autonomous status, and it is also why the geometry of curves and ﬁgures
is controlled by calculation. Lines are accepted in geometry because they can
be expressed in terms of ratios which are regulated by algebra. Descartes’
dream, or rather his conviction, was that the two criteria for acceptance as
certain knowledge, namely the property of being exactly constructible and
of being expressed algebraically, would turn out to be one and the same.
4. The Theory of Proportions
One of the central and most important ideas in Cartesian mathematics is
the theory of proportions, which is the heart of his algebraic geometry. The
innovations of Descartes’ procedure were the new notation and the power of
generalisation, however, the rules of transformation, simpliﬁcation and the
authorised procedures are founded in Euclidean theory. From Regulae to
Geometry Descartes repeatedly stated that to replace a geometrical problem
by its symbolic writing and the solution of that equation are but applications
of that ancient theory: “. . . those particular sciences which come together
under the name of mathematics, even though their objects are diﬀerent, are
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all concordant in so far as they consider only the diﬀerent relations [ratios]
or proportions to be found among these objects”20.
Rule VI also demonstrates the principal secret of the method2 : by means of
an examination of a proportion which starts oﬀ simple and then, through an
initial result, leads on to a problem of greater complexity, and from there to
an even higher level of complexity, etc.. Rule XIV categorically states: ”Let us
conclude safely and ﬁrmly that perfectly determined questions are devoid of
diﬃculties, or nearly so, except the one of reducing proportions into equalities
or equations, and any time such a diﬃculty is met, it can easily, and must,
be let apart from all other matters and then be translated into extension and
ﬁgures”22.
Jules Vuillemin expresses his view categorically in this context when he
writes: “More than being just a theory of the parallelism between functions
and curves, Geometry is ﬁrst and foremost a theory of proportions”
Which is no punctual conception of the method since, to quote Vuillemin
again “to the philosopher, the invention of analytic geometry was secondary
to the invention of the universal method of thought contained. . . in the general
theory of proportions”.
5. From Regulae To Geometry
The question of the relation of Regulae to Geometry can be best understood
by recognising the role of the theory of proportions in Descartes’ thought. The
grand theory of ratios is the center of his statements of project. As stipulated
in Regulae , the objects ok knowledge, in their more general aspect, are
orderly examined in terms of progressive proportions. Thus the theory of
proportions is the key to the MathesisUniversalis. On the other hand, the
theory of proportions is the means by which geometry becomes algebraic,
thus unifying the mathematical sciences.
If a common, identical kernel (noyau) is acknowledged as being a part of the
scientiﬁc Project presented in Regulae and in the 1637 treaty, the question
remains, how much was the treaty a realisation of theRegulae?Was Regulae’s
objective of establishing a universal science part of the same project to unify
the ﬁeld s in mathematics which were previously considered to be separate?
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Not at all, and some commentators have considered the 1637Essay as the
abandon of the past program aiming at founding a science of everything
available to human understanding.
6. The Mathesis, An Inaugural Project
Hence it is necessary to assess what Descartes’ project was in the Mathesis
Universalis. In a letter he wrote on the 26 March 1619 to his friend Beeckman,
he conﬁdes his idea of “a science with a new foundation, which would allow
us to resolve in general all the questions one might ask oneself in whatever
quantity, continuous or discontinuous, but each one according to its nature
[. . . ] An incredibly ambitious project”.
Later on Mathesis Universalis was presented in Regulae. In Rule IV we are
told “this discipline ought to contain the ﬁrst rudiments of human reason,
and be broad enough to bring out the truths of any subject whatsoever”and
this is deﬁned more precisely later on: “there must be a certain general science
which explains everything which can be asked about order and measure, and
which is concerned with no particular subject matter, and that this very thing
is called “universal mathematics“, not by an arbitrary appellation, but by a
usage which is already accepted and of long standing, because in it is contained
everything on account of which other sciences are called parts of mathematics.
How much this science surpasses both in usefulness and in facility the others
which are subordinate to it is apparent from the fact that it is concerned with
everything with which the latter are concerned, and many other things as
well”.
Descartes adds that he has already pushed the study of this science far enough
and that he will give the main outlines of his results; there follow the rules
of the method.
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7. The Perfectly Formed Questions of Geo-
metry
As we have already seen, mathematics is both the proof that a universal
science exists, but also acts as a mask to conceal it. Geometry, arithmetic
and even logic are the dressing rather than the constitutive parts of the only
science which is of real value. The Cartesian project does not aim at exhibit-
ing that science in it absolute purity but at dressing and adorning (orner) it,
so that it could be more acceptable to the human mind. Since Mathesis Uni-
versalis was purely intellectual, “it is dressed with ﬁgures and numbers as a
kind of tribute to the imagination, conceived as an auxiliary to the mind”.
In this formulation there is a connection between Mathesis Universalis and
a reorganised form of mathematics. Mathesis Universalis presents itself in
masked form since it is, by essence, purely intellectual and abstract and can-
not be brought before us for mathematical consideration, rather we consider
its masks and clothing as found in those perfectly posed questions which
are geometry and algebra. Then these sciences which have been dressed in
their adequate veil are in a position to be examined by reason, aided by the
imagination.
In order therefore to save the decorations (ﬁgures and numbers) from mere
vanity it must to be stressed that they are but the outﬁtting of another
knowledge, far grander than the one to be found in their own proceedings.
One will not attempt to do away with the mask or the clothing, but it is
extremely important to identify it as such, or else (sinon) the only object of
study would be a sheet of ectoplasm, and not the appearance behind which
the most sublime method of using the human understanding is accessible.
An examination of the structure of the Regulae will help us deﬁne the rela-
tionship of algebraic geometry to Mathesis Universalisa∗∗∗.
After the presentation of precepts related to simple propositions in the ﬁrst
twelve rules there is an examination of perfectly understood questions in the
next twelwe rules. following . Finally the last twelve rules was to deal with
imperfectiy understood questions. This section was never written, but it can
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still be compared to the part which was written, even though this too was
incomplete. Descartes outlines a study project and methodology completely
adapted to mathematics in the general sciences section in which constants
and variables, premises and conclusions, known and unknown terms are so
clearly identiﬁed that the problems can be posed in the form of an equation.
The important role of ﬁgures and algebra in the nine rules drawn up in this
section was inevitable since perfect questions are only found in arithmetic and
geometry. But Descartes also indicates that it is necessary to pass through
this part of the method to arrive at the next stage. This following stage
was to be concerned with precisely those questions which were not perfectly
formed, for instance in the experimental sciences, the natural sciences and
parts of physics such as magnetism and sounds.
Does the third Essay achieve the project envisaged in Regulae On the basis
of my preceding observations, the answer is no, in as much as Geometry is
obviously not the Mathesis Universalis treatise. And yet we can view this in
a far more positive light if we refer to the writings in the Regulae concerned
with the examination of perfectly formed questions. The 1637 Geometry does
achieve this part of the general project even with all its inadequacies and
errors.
It is then possible to claim that the 1637 treatise does not reﬂect a change
in the project, to say that it is faithful to the hopes of the 1620s, even if
it only completes the ﬁrst part of the project. It is therefore a partial but
decisive success since what can be known is understood by applying the
precepts of the method, and the world and all the sciences which can be
used to understand it make use of the essential attribute of matter which is
extension, and extension is understood by means of the science of continuous
magnitudes laid out in Geometry. This is why Descartes wrote to Mersenne,
“I claim to have demonstrated [the superiority of the Method] through my
Geometry”.
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Conclusion
Let us therefore reconsider the four Cartesian ﬁeld s involved in this discus-
sion.
Traditional mathematics. In this are found both the seeds (graines) of
divine certainties and the criteria for generalisation. It is a disorderly,
poorly developed discipline which runs the risk of being fruitless.
Mathesis Universalis is the general science of ordering and measure-
ment. It is concerned with universal knowledge. This is the only science
with which Regulae are concerned.
The Method is a strategy for the acquisition of all certain knowledge.
This is also presented in Regulae, as well as in the Discourse of course.
Algebraic geometry. This is the uniﬁed image, the scaﬀolding (e´chaf-
faudage) or architecture of things understood in terms of extension and
perfect deﬁnition. It is served by algebra.
And here are their respective positions as I understand them.
Geometry is obviously not Mathesis Universalis since it is not concerned
with imperfectly known questions. But Geometry is nevertheless adequate,
in conformity with the method as stated in Regulae and in Discourse.
Geometry is close to Discourse not only in terms of publishing chronology,
but also because a more precise wording, like “I will take the best one of
them. . .”reﬂects the maturation of the project.
Geometry is however much more readable and more structured by statements
from Regulae, particularly those concerning the theory of proportions, the
absolute and relative characteristics of the elements of a question and the
formation of equations from problems, even though important aspects of the
doctrine had evolved.
Thus ordinary mathematics fed and inspired the method like a muse. The
method was brilliantly illustrated and supported by Geometry without being
accused of being a ’deduction’ or ’application’ of the Discourse.
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Mathesis Universalis can also claim Geometry as one of its elements. Thus
the Regulae’s project was realised, within limits indeed, but in this realisa-
tion it was remarkably complete. The coupling of ’traditional mathematics-
reorganised mathematics’ is a particular expression of the coupling ’individ-
ual sciences-Mathesis Universalis ’. In this sense to succeed in the passage
of the ﬁrst coupling is a partial realisation of a corresponding passage in
the second coupling. The success of this passage of course depends upon the
method.
It has been said that for Descartes to know is to construct; this claim in-
forms the radical constructivist thesis. It is true that the way in which we
understand exterior objects is through extension (as also for geometrical ob-
jects). It is also perfectly correct that the ﬁrst certainties, the ﬁrst knowledge,
that we acquire in geometry are concerned with extension. Likewise, the ﬁrst
certain knowledge we have is generally intuition.
It goes without saying that a science restricted to the founding intuitions
would be more or less meaningless. Scientiﬁc statements are composed from
the results of long deductive chains. To know, for Descartes, is thus above
all to be able to guarantee the validity of these chains of reasoning. While
the ﬁrst two precepts of the method are related to intuitions, those following
them are concerned precisely with the processes of creating and mastering
deductive chains. Without them there would be no method, and therefore no
science, neither universal, nor particular.
Now, if extension, or lines themselves, are the constituents of geometrical
intuitions, the rules of algebra are the means of controlling the deductive
chains of geometry. This is the subject matter of the beginning of Book I.
One could thus say that algebra is to geometry what the third precept of the
method is to the ﬁrst, and what the procedures for the creation of deductive
chains of reasoning are to intuitions.
This seems to be an important point to make since it reduces what all too
often appears to be a conﬂict between knowledge by geometrical construction
and knowledge by algebraic generalisation. This is to contrast a constructivist
Descartes to an algebrist Descartes even within his own single mathematical
treatise. Admittedly this conﬂict is present from the point of view of the
history of mathematics, but it makes little sense in the context of Descartes
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the philosopher-mathematician. As the particular appearances of a science
demonstrated according to the precepts of the method, algebra and geome-
try, the two complementary aspects of an orderly and guaranteed area of
knowledge, could not be opposed to each other. Philosophically this is un-
derstood, and Geometry provides some brilliant mathematical arguments in
favour of an adequation of knowledge attained by the construction of curves
and solutions and the knowledge of algebraic expression. Of course in mathe-
matics argument does not replace demonstration, and this is lacking. What is
-mathematically speaking- missing in Descartes’ work is precisely the demon-
stration of this main contention: what we may know through construction,
we may also know through algebraic symbolism.
I would even be tempted to add ’and reciprocally’. To my mind this absence
is in principle unimportant or harmless: the certainty of the general method-
ical and philosophical reasons, secured by mastery of a series of argument-
examples in which truth can be seen as dressed geometrically and then al-
gebraically, is suﬃcients5. The reception of the third Essay in Discourse on
Method was rather cool. It was certainly a failure in the eyes of the public,
and a stubborn reticence was most of the specialists’ responses to the trea-
tise. There were weighty polemical reasons for this response, but all the same
they are not enough to explain this reaction.
The greatest misunderstanding was a result of the fact that Descartes thought
that he had, and indeed claimed to have, ’exhausted geometry’, which was
obviously untrue, as further developments of the science soon proceeded to
demonstrate. The Cartesian claim must however be treated seriously for it is
not unfounded. The switch to algebra, a decisive move of Descartes’, will soon
explode the traditional boundaries of mathematics: the character of numbers
and lines, the possible new algorithmic expressions, the new writing were soon
to free themselves of their geometrical roots. New equations and new loci
which found algebraic expression expanded the limits of the mathematical
science. This is suggestive of Leibniz’s thought, which showed an exception-
ally clear awareness of the expansion of mathematics. Analytic and inﬁnites-
imal geometry, the theory of equations, transcendental curves. . . these were
the vast new chapters to be opened just after the composition of Geometry.
Now, what is the matter for Descartes in the third Essay? It was certainly
not an attempt to transform the nature of the objects of this science. The
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stakes (enjeu) involved in the great algebraic translation did not appear im-
mediately. Initially it was surreptitious (subreptice), and appeared to be a
commodity whose essential consequences the authors(Descartes, as well as
Fermat) did not immediately recognise: the powerful overthrow (renverse-
ment) of the contents, objects and even the methods of mathematics.
The establishment of a new way of writing mathematics only seemed to be
a memory aid, a way of extending the traditional geometry of ﬁgures and
curves more clearly, which was no meaner achievement.
Born as a memory aid, as an abbreviated notation, switch to algebra will ﬁnd
its accomplishment by exploding the very status of mathematical objects and
their relations.∗∗∗
All the rigour of Cartesian geometry, and even its metaphysics were needed
to restrain and withstand the impetuous stream he had freed when he blew
up the ﬂood gates of symbolic writing.
It was indeed a question of memory. The overloaded memory and the accu-
mulation of information did not only lead to forgetting, it also made their
presence confusing to understanding. The intellectual economy also aims at
clarifying contents so as allow an actual and faithful memorisation.
This is the idea which Leon Brunschvicg considers as being common to both
Descartes and Spinoza: “The characteristic of Cartesian geometry is that it
applies an original method to problems which already were or could have been
resolved through the System of synthetic reasoning of the Ancients. With-
out properly speaking, modifying the reality to which the mathematics were
applied, this approach transformed the way in which the mind applied itself
to this reality; it restricted the imagination and put into play the activity of
intelligence”3∧ .
Cartesian memory is the method at work, and in this case algebra organises
knowledge of extension.
The enterprise was thus not to transform the nature of the mathematical
sciences but to transform the study of it. Then, an illusion arose, a chimera:
the switch to algebra appeared to be a deﬁnitive solution, an end to confusion
and blindness, and ultimately it seemed to announce, or even to realise, the
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closure of mathematics. This illusion is understandable: without changing the
nature of mathematical science itself, in the context of what the reasonable
and rational exercise of understanding authorised to be examined and un-
derstood, in a word, by not expanding the ﬁeld of legitimate knowledge and
at the same time multiplying the means of investigation of the human mind
adventuring in the realm of geometry, by considerably increasing its ability
to synthesise and make deductions, it was very logical to consider that it
would be possible to explore the entirety of mathematical knowledge.
In order to understand this illusion more completely it would be necessary
to examine how Descartes treated those mathematical questions which were
obviously not contained in the framework he had established. He both re-
solves them and rejects them. Such is the case when he achieves, through the
method of limits his solution of the fall of bodies in the early exchanges with
Beeckman, an other example would be his quadrature of the cycloid which
he managed by a method of indivisibles7 but whose importance he underes-
timated; a third example comes up with Debeaune’s remarkable problem for
which he gave the transcendental solution while at the same time claiming
that this was the result of two movements which were “so incommensurable
that they cannot be adjusted exactly to each other [. . . ] this line is of the kind
that I rejected out of my Geometry as being only mechanical ones ; such again
are those imaginary roots which he allowed to appear in his third book but
to which he only ever accorded some sort of “spectral existence”∧9.
Thus are preserved the boundaries of the country which he pretended to have
entirely explored.
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